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SENSITIVE  
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DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  
UPCOMING EVENTS  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
AND NEXT STEPS

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SUBJECT: DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND  
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS,  
AND NEXT STEPS

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. (SBU) On Day 3 of the U.S.-South Africa Nonproliferation and Disarmament Dialogue, participants shared views and plans for upcoming international events, and discussed next steps. Einhorn provided an overview of the latest U.S. plans for the upcoming UN Security Council Summit on Disarmament and Nonproliferation. He exchanged views with Minty on the IAEA General Conference (Minty recommended a Presidential Statement instead of a resolution on contentious Middle East issues), UNGA First Committee session (both countries need to help manage expectations post-Prague speech), and UNSCR 1540 Comprehensive Review (SAG unconvinced of UNSCR 1540's utility, but will participate in the review). NSC Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction Laura Holgate provided information on the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit and Sherpa planning meeting. South Africa will send a senior representative, but has not yet designated an official Sherpa. Planning for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was discussed at length, including the need for discussions on abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision, improving the procedural setup of Treaty implementation, and coordination to build consensus around substantive policy agendas. Participants agreed to a series of next steps, to include a robust agenda for expanded discussion and cooperation in the coming months. A second round of the Dialogue was proposed for November 2009 in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with site visits to U.S. nuclear facilities.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT ON DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION  
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[1](#)2. (SBU) Special Advisor Einhorn confirmed that President Obama would chair a September 24 UN Security Council Summit on disarmament and nonproliferation (per the U.S. presidency of the Security Council in September 2009). The objective of the summit is to have Heads of State and Government endorse a broad non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, affirm and reaffirm commitments, and establish future objectives to set the stage for the Nuclear Security Summit and NPT RevCon. Planning for the session is ongoing, and the United States is consulting with the Council, plus other UN members (such as South Africa), about meeting objectives. Einhorn emphasized that the USG wants the UNSC Summit to address broad nonproliferation and disarmament themes that are regime-wide.

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IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE  
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¶3. (SBU) Einhorn reiterated outcomes that the U.S. hopes for at the General Conference and on its margins: signing of the draft nuclear energy R&D agreement, announcement of the new bilateral energy dialogue, and South African participation in the Sherpa planning meeting for the nuclear security summit. Regarding the General Conference itself and the perennial problem of contentious Middle East issues, the United States hoped the Chair could gain agreement on a single, consensus resolution. Minty hoped all would avoid heated debate at the General Conference. Minty also expressed his personal view that it would be much more complicated, if not impossible, to get a resolution because resolutions require sponsors, and sponsorship issues can unleash political rivalries. Also, once a resolution is adopted, that country will want another one next year. He recommended a Presidential Statement, instead. Both countries pledged to work constructively towards consensus.

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NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT  
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¶4. (SBU) Following President Obama's personal invitation to President Zuma on the margins of the G-8 Summit, NSC Senior Director Holgate said that formal invitations to the Nuclear Security Summit would be sent soon. The goal for the summit would be to build common understanding on threats, and on the importance of security for all nuclear materials in military and civilian contexts. Our objective is for Heads of State and Government to identify ways in which countries could more fully implement their existing commitments, rather than make it a venue for pressuring countries to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, or other such efforts. The Summit agenda and outcomes will be refined during a series of three Sherpa meetings in advance of the April Summit. Holgate noted that the Summit likely would produce a document of commitments for action on a number of issues, from accounting to physical protection, nuclear forensics and enforcement, information and intelligence sharing, etc. The Summit also can provide a forum to showcase existing efforts towards strengthening the global nuclear security agenda. A special side conversation is being considered for nuclear industry leaders, since the majority of nuclear materials are under private control in the nuclear industry. She solicited South African views on Summit planning.

¶5. (SBU) Einhorn added that the United States hopes that Heads of State and Government attendance would motivate bureaucracies to consider in the coming months what more they could do to advance nuclear security within individual countries in advance of the Summit. Minty and, separately, Department of Energy Acting Director General Nelisiwe Magubane noted that the SAG would likely not appoint a permanent Sherpa in time for the mid-September planning meeting. The SAG would send a senior official in September, with a final Sherpa appointed thereafter. (Note: A few days after the Dialogue, State officials received word that the senior official representing South Africa at the Sherpa planning meeting would be Ditebogo Kgomo, not Minty as expected.)

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2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE  
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¶6. (SBU) Einhorn stated that, for many years, the P-5 looked at the NPT RevCons as damage-limiting exercises. The United States, however, is taking a very different approach this

time. The regime is under great stress, and more than a consensus final document is needed to remedy it. The USG views the RevCon as an important milestone on a longer road (not a destination), and will actively seek to improve how the regime operates over the coming years. Mabhongo said that South Africa had a similar approach to the RevCon, and shared the United States' concern about balancing the three pillars of the NPT appropriately.

¶7. (SBU) Minty said that South Africa was very interested in the problems associated with abuse of the withdrawal provision in the Treaty (see Day 1 Septel) and wished to work with the United States on a way forward. Negative security assurances were an important confidence-building measure for the NPT-defined Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in moving the RevCon agenda forward. A major objective for South Africa in May would be a reaffirmation of the 1995 RevCon consensus outcome and the 2000 RevCon Final Document, especially the "13 practical steps" towards nuclear dismantlement contained therein.

¶8. (SBU) Einhorn contended that circumstances have changed since the 2000 RevCon result and the "13 practical steps," and the disarmament agenda needed to be updated. He hoped that delegations would not become fixated on precise application of the 13 steps, noting that certain parts, such as the one affirming the ABM Treaty (highlighted in step 7), have been overtaken by events. The Parties therefore need to chart a course for the future with an agenda that's appropriate for 2010 and beyond. Part of that will be the vision that President Obama outlined in his Prague speech. As part of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the USG is looking at the role of nuclear weapons in our national security policy. We are also reviewing our declaratory policy, including previous statements on negative security assurances. Einhorn said it was premature to commit to specifics at this time, but the USG is aware of other countries' interest in that issue.

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¶9. (SBU) Minty said the NPT review process needs to be strengthened. The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings are increasingly frequented by junior delegates with no mandate to negotiate for consensus and with no substantive grasp of the issues to debate. Issues of methodology and process are just as important as substance in ensuring a successful RevCon. Minty endorsed Einhorn's suggestion that the United States and South Africa discuss new approaches to strengthen the review process.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND THE COMPREHENSIVE  
REVIEW  
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¶10. (SBU) Einhorn gave the USG perspective on UNSCR 1540, and sought South Africa's views on the resolution, and on funding mechanisms for implementation. He also informed Minty of a U.S.-funded and UNODA-sponsored January workshop on reducing biological threats in Africa. Mabhongo replied that South Africa has had concerns with UNSCR 1540 from the beginning, particularly the way that it was passed through the Council. South Africa was not as optimistic about the utility of UNSCR 1540. Most of the work under the resolution focused on states instead of non-state actors, which the resolution was designed to target. South Africa had seen minimal progress on implementation. Country reports submitted pursuant to 1540 Committee requirements lacked substance. Minty said the resolution failed to address illicit networks, striking against the credibility of the resolution. Regarding implementation reporting, Minty had previously suggested that the 1540 Committee use a simple questionnaire that the Council could use to follow up with countries whose responses indicated sophisticated technology and capabilities. As it is now, even the first question is way above the level of most countries. Minty recommended

that the UNSC take a country-by-country approach to see what each individual country needs. Nevertheless, the SAG was willing to discuss the issue. Einhorn encouraged South Africa to convey its concerns during the UNSCR 1540 Comprehensive Review. He agreed that country-specific assessments of national efforts, gaps, and the assistance needed should help implementation move forward.

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CLOSING REMARKS  
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¶11. (SBU) Einhorn led the closing remarks. Balancing the three NPT pillars was important, but so was balancing responsibilities for strengthening the regime. The United States is prepared to do more than its fair share in pursuing nuclear disarmament and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy; but, in exchange, we hope that NNWS, including Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, will accept their responsibilities and join with us to strengthen barriers against further proliferation. South Africa is a leading voice in the NAM and has a greater understanding of these issues than many of its NAM colleagues, in part because of its unique historical experience. Although cognizant of the pressure to maintain NAM solidarity, Einhorn expressed hope that South Africa would use its enormous credibility and knowledge to lead the NAM toward pragmatic solutions to these problems that genuinely serve NAM interests. In closing, Einhorn expressed USG satisfaction with the week's nuclear security discussions. Overall, the meetings marked a good start toward fulfilling our Presidents' directive to create a bilateral dialogue on these issues. Einhorn expressed the expectation that South Africa and the United States would maintain constant contact through DICO and State, and that engagement would not be limited to episodic visits.

¶12. (SBU) Minty expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to build a partnership with South Africa. He looked forward to expanded cooperation, but cautioned that the SAG often faces unexpected demands on its time and attention from within the continent. Meeting regional needs is a principal objective of South African foreign policy, and Minty said it seems to "never end." South Africa also has commitments to the African Union and the South African Development Community (including its year-long Chairmanship), all of which create unanticipated obligations that South Africa must fulfill—a persistent problem. (Note: Minty mentioned earlier in the Dialogue that Russia and France had proposed similar future dialogues, which also would take up finite SAG resources.

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Embassy Pretoria has heard rumors of a Japanese Dialogue, as well.) Minty reiterated South Africa's concerns about "meddling with foundations" (such as the NPT, UN Security Council Resolutions, etc.), because it establishes precedents that others can meddle with as they wish. This relates to South Africa's strong commitment to multilateralism: the SAG seeks buy-in and consensus because that ensures the legitimacy of decisions taken. Regarding block positions in multilateral meetings, South Africa tries to work across groups on global concepts, and speaks its mind on issues of strong belief irrespective of any block position. This, he said, is South Africa's commitment, and it will not change. For example, at the 1995 NPT RevCon, South Africa sided against the NAM by supporting the U.S. push for indefinite extension of the Treaty. South Africa tries to generate constructive approaches to build bridges between the G-77 and the G-8. In closing, Minty looked forward to robust, continuing cooperation with the United States over the coming months, coordinated through DICO and the State Department. End of Day 3 discussions.

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POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION  
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¶13. (U) For further information, please contact State POC (ISN/RA) Krista Fisher (202-647-6793, fisherkk@state.gov, NNSA POCs Heather Looney (202-586-6772, Heather.Looney@nnsa.doe.gov) or Andrew Bieniawski (202-586-0775, Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov), or NRC POC Cindy Rosales Cooper (301-415-1168, Cindy.Rosales-Cooper@nrc.gov).

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DIALOGUE PARTICIPANTS  
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¶14. (U) United States:

Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (State)  
Laura Holgate, Senior Director, WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction (NSC)  
Bruce Mallet, Deputy Executive Director for Operation (NRC)  
Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/NNSA)  
Andrew Bieniawski, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Global Threat Reduction (DOE/NNSA)  
Dave Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator for International Material Protection and Cooperation (DOE/NNSA)  
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Dave Barber, Physical Protection Expert, Sandia National Laboratory  
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¶15. (U) South Africa:

Abdul S. Minty, Ambassador and Special Representative on Disarmament and NEPAD, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DICO)  
Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (DICO)  
Johann Kellerman, Deputy Director, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (DICO)  
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Lillian Sedumoeng, Deputy Director: Nuclear Non-Proliferation

(DOE)

G Clappison, Acting CEO, National Nuclear Regulator (NNR)

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Management (responsible for Safeguards and Security)

(NECSA)

W J Theron, Emergency Planner (responsible for Emergency  
planning and response) (NECSA)

Chantal Janneker, Senior Manager: Group Communication and  
Stakeholder Relations (NECSA)

Lucky Molefe, Senior Manager International Trade and Customs  
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